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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (g) and (j). This appeal is subject to assignment to the Utah Court of 
Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Accordingly, this appeal was assigned 
to the Utah Court of Appeal from the Utah Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue (Causation) 
Whether the trial court erred in its findings on causation that: 
(A) "The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the 
instant case that may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness 
are that Linda Fox was descending the stairs and she fell. 
(B)No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's senses, testify 
whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical 
condition of Linda Foxfs knee." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 918, 
916,U10.) 
(C) "Linda Fox fell without the physical intervention of any actor." (Findings of 
Fact, Record 916, f 11) 
(D) "No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine 
the condition of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell." (Findings of Fact, 
Record 915, f 13) 
(E) "Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly 
fell." (Findings of Fact, Record 915,1fl4) 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's ruling was in the context of the defendant's motion to exclude 
expert testimony regarding causation during which the plaintiffs stipulated that they 
would not call any expert witnesses. The trial court concluded that due to Linda's pre-
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existing arthritic condition in her knee, the plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, 
sustain their cause of action without calling expert witnesses to prove causation. The 
trial court held that its decision was dispositive of the case and granted defendant's oral 
motion to dismiss, presumably under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Transcript, Record 924, 63-67) 
We review a trial court's findings of fact according to the standard set out in 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides: "Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." Id.; see also Orton, 970 P.2d at 1256-57; Consolidation Coal Co. v. Div. 
of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Reid v. Mut of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). "A trial court's factual finding is deemed 'clearly 
erroneous1 only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence." Doelle v. Bradley, 784 
P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); see also Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & 
Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 773 (Utah 1995); Reid, 776 P.2d at 899-900. Wilson Supply, 
Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 2002 UT 94, f 12. 
In the context of a bench trial, the directed verdict's procedural counterpart is a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 41(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Grossen, 
1999 UT App 167 at [^8. [U] Chryst v. Braun, 2005 UT App 470 (Utah App. 
11/03/2005) 
Under rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may dismiss if 
"(1) the claimant has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
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case, or (2) the trial court is not persuaded by that evidence." Walker v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 340 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "As with a directed verdict, whether 
dismissal was appropriate for failure to make a prima facie case is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness." Grossen, 1999 UT App 167 at *|8 (citation omitted). [U] 
Chryst v. Braun, 2005 UT App 470 (Utah App. 11/03/2005) 
When reviewing the grant of a directed verdict, the appellate court reviews the 
decision of the trial court for correctness. For a directed verdict to be appropriate, the 
evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not differ on the facts based on the 
evidence presented at trial. Mgmt. Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Assfn v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). We examine the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that evidence and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, we 
must reverse. Id. If evidence raises a "question of material fact," it is reversible error for 
a trial court to grant a motion for directed verdict. See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 
104, f 16, 990 P.2d 933. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., 104 P.3d 
1185, 2004 UT 80, f 10 (Utah 10/01/2004). 
The question of proximate causation "is generally reserved for the jury." 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 486 (citing Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544 
(Utah 1984)). Consequently, the trial court may rule as a matter of law on this issue 
only if: "(1) there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation 
to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to 
be derived from the evidence on proximate causation." Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487 
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(citing Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 
(Ariz. 1990) (en banc). Two standards of review exist for reviewing questions regarding 
the admissibility of evidence. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 6200 South Assocs., 872 
P.2d 462, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "With respect to the trial court's selection, 
interpretation, and application of a particular rule of evidence [or procedure], we apply 
a correction of error standard. When the rule . . . requires the trial court to balance 
specified factors to determine admissibility, fabuse of discretion or reasonability is the 
appropriate standard.1" Id. (citation omitted); see also Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 
339, 347 (Utah 1996) (stating trial court "is allowed considerable . . . discretion in the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this 
court will not reverse"). However, "even where error is found, reversal is appropriate 
only in those cases where, after review of all of the evidence presented at trial, it 
appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result 
would have been reached.'" Utah Dep't of Transp., 872 P.2d at 465 (citation omitted). 
Moreover, the person asserting error has the burden to show not only that the error 
occurred but also that it was substantial and prejudicial. See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147, 154 (Utah 1987), as cited in Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 
511(Utahl999). 
Issue Preserved in Trial Court 
The issues relating to causation were preserved in the trial court in the Affidavit 
of Linda A. Fox (Record, commencing on page 083); in the Affidavit of Joseph R. Fox 
(Record, commencing on page 075); in the Affidavit of Linda A. Fox (Record, 
10 
commencing on page 467); in Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record, commencing on page 337); in Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendant's Motion in Limine (Record pp. 883-874), and in the Bench Trial Transcript 
(Record p. 924, at transcript pages 13 - 24). 
Second Issue (Conclusions of Law) 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that: 
(A) ".. .the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the 
stairs and had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were 
dangerous..." (Conclusions of Law, Record p. 915, <|[ 1) 
(B) "The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on 
any subject, including but not limited to: a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and b. 
Linda Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29, 2004; 
precluded evidence that Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-
existing, osteoarthritis joint narrowing, knee which had loss of cartilage." 
(Conclusions of Law, Record p. 915, f2) 
(C) "In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. 
Fox fell because of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for 
some other cause, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation." 
(Conclusions of Law, Record p. 914, f4) 
(D) "In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the 
reasonable necessity of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs 
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cannot sustain their burden of proof as to damages." (Conclusions of Law, Record p. 
914,15) 
(E) "Joseph R. Fox!s claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox 
cannot sustain her burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff 
Joseph R. Fox's claim for loss of consortium fails." (Conclusions of Law, Record p. 
914,16.) 
Standard for Review 
Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according 
the trial court no particular deference." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 
1998); see also Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 938 
P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 54 
P.3d 1177, 2002 UT 94, 111. 
Issues Preserved in Trial Court 
The issues relating to the court's conclusions were preserved in the trial court in 
the Affidavit of Linda A. Fox (Record, commencing on page 083); in the Affidavit of 
Joseph R. Fox (Record, commencing on page 075); in the Affidavit of Linda A. Fox 
(Record, commencing on page 467); Plaintiffs1 Opposition tp Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record, commencing on page 337); Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendant's Motion in Limine (Record pp. 883-874), and in the Bench Trial Transcript 
(Record p. 924, at transcript pages 13-24 and 63-67). 
The issues relating to the court's conclusions on medical damages were 
preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine 
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(Record pp. 883-874) and in the Bench Trial Transcript (Record p. 924, at transcript 
pages 16, 27 and 63-67). 
Third Issue (Validity of UCA $78-27-33, as amended) 
Whether the trial court was correct in holding that UCA §78-27-33, as amended, 
was impliedly repealed and was unconstitutional on its face as being inconsistent with 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(2) and Rule 803(4). 
Standard of Review 
This issue was raised for the first time in the defendant's oral argument in 
support of its Motion in Limine. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, 
which the court of appeal reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. 
Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, 1 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (quoting State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, % 30, 40 P.3d 611). Furthermore, the reviewing court presumes the 
legislation being challenged is constitutional, and resolves any reasonable doubts in 
favor of constitutionality. Id.; see also Utah Sch. Bds. Assfn v. State Bd. of Educ, 2001 
UT2,f 9, 17P.3dll25. 
We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court's interpretation. Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, 
f 4, 53 P.3d 473. Our aim in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. In re Marriage of 
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23, 1 P.3d 1074, Bd. of Ed. of Jordan Sch. Dist., supra, f 8. 
Pursuant to our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain 
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language to determine its meaning. . "We read the plain language of the statute as a 
whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter 
and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, Tf 17, 66 P.3d 592; see also 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) ("[S]tatutory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful." (citation and quotation omitted)); Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, 
Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994) ("[T]erms of a statute are to be interpreted as a 
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion." (citation and quotation 
omitted)); Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) ("It is our duty to 
construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a 
construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to 
construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts."). In addition, "[i]t is axiomatic 
that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the 
legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of 
Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988), Id. J 9. 
Issue Preserved in Trial Court 
The issues relating to the constitutionality and implied repeal of UCA §78-27-
33, as amended, were preserved in the trial court as recorded in the Bench Trial 
Transcript (Record p. 924, at bench trial transcript pages 56 - 63). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS 
Article 8, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, provides in pertinent part: The 
Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of 
the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-
thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-37-33, provides: Except as otherwise provided in this 
act, any statement, either written or oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 
days of an occurrence or while this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a 
result of injuries sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a 
person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except a 
peace officer, shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding brought by or 
against the injured person for damages sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless: 
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement has been left with the injured party at the 
time the statement was taken; and (2) the statement has not been disavowed in writing 
within fifteen days of the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of 
the injured person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which the person 
has been confined, whichever date is later. Amended by Chapter 282, 1998 General 
Session. (The amendment changed the language from "law enforcement officer'1 to 
"peace officer".) 
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Utah Code Annotated 78-37-36, provides: Right of rescission or disavowal of 
release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing in the law. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) provides in part: The statement is 
offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(4), states in pertinent part: The following are 
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past 
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 701, provides: If the witness is not testifying as an 
expert, the witness1 testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness1 testimony or the determination 
of a fact in issue. 
Utah Supreme Court Pro Curium Order, September 10, 1985, In Re: Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence To Be Used in the Courts of This State, provides in part: 
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"Pursuant to the provisions of Article 8, Section 4, the Constitution of Utah, as 
amended, the Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not 
inconsistent or superseded by the rules of Procedure and Evidence heretofore adopted 
by this court. Effective as of July 1985." 
The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules states, in part: Any existing 
statutes inconsistent with these rules... will be impliedly repealed. 
Rule 4Kb), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: Involuntary dismissal; 
effect thereof. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the 
court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings 
as provided iRule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Nature of the Case 
This is a pro se, negligence based, personal injury case for which the Plaintiff 
Linda Fox seeks money damages for, inter alia, medical expenses, lost income, 
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disfigurement, and change of life style, and for which the Plaintiff Joseph Fox seeks 
money damages for lost consortium. A defective step on the west stairway of the 
Harman Building on the campus of BYU caused the Plaintiff Linda Fox to fall and 
break her leg below the knee as she was exiting the Harman Building after she 
purchased a ticket to Women's Conference 2004. Specifically, the cause of Linda's fall 
was a worn out, loose metal nosing on the steps. The Defendant had notice of the 
defective step nosing and failed to give notice to the Plaintiff and failed exercise 
reasonable care in repairing the step. At the time of her fall, the Plaintiff Linda Fox 
suffered from a slightly symptomatic arthritic condition in her knee. There is no expert 
testimony that her pre-existing condition was a material factor in her fall. (Record p. 
037; Second Amended Complaint). 
Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a scheduled bench trial before the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Provo District. Prior to taking evidence, the trial court heard oral 
arguments on the defendant's motion to exclude any expert testimony that might be 
offered by the plaintiffs concerning causation and damages. Neither the plaintiffs nor 
the defendant had identified any expert witnesses as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The plaintiffs stipulated that they did not intend to call any expert 
witnesses. (Record p. 924; Bench Trial Transcript pp. 2-4 and 13-14). 
18 
Also, during oral argument, the defendant, for the first time, raised the issue of 
the constitutionality of UCA 78-27-33, as amended, in regard to the admission into 
evidence of certain statements reportedly made by Linda Fox to the defendant's EMTs 
at the scene of her fall. The plaintiffs denied having made the statements and opposed 
the admission of evidence of the statements because the foundational provisions of the 
statute had not been satisfied by the defendant. There was no dispute that the defendant 
had not complied with the statute. The court heard arguments from both parties. 
(Record p. 924; Bench Trial Transcript pp. 44-63) 
Trial Court Disposition 
After hearing oral arguments, the court ruled that the statute, UCA 78-27-33, as 
amended, was unconstitutional and that it had been impliedly repealed by order of the 
Supreme Court, and, therefore, it would admit the EMTs1 evidence of Linda's 
statements. There was no other evidence of Linda's statements. (Record 924; Bench 
Trial Transcript pp. 63-64). 
With regard to the defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony, and the 
plaintiffs' stipulation in this regard, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not, as a 
matter of law, in view of Linda's arthritic condition in her knee, sustain their prima facie 
burden of proof concerning causation without presenting expert testimony that her pre-
existing condition was not a material factor in her fall. (Apart from the fact that she had 
the condition and her disputed statement, as reported by the EMTs, that as she was 
descending the stairs tier foot came out from underneath her, there was no other 
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evidence that her condition was a material factor in her fall.) Further, the court ruled 
that Linda could not sustain her burden of proof on medical expense damages, even 
though she had paid for the services, without expert testimony as to the necessity and 
reasonableness the treatment she received. The court held that its decision in this 
regard was dispositive of the issues on causation and damages. Accordingly, the court 
granted the defendant's oral motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Record p. 924; Bench Trial Transcript pp. 63-68.) 
Statement of Facts 
Fact No 1. In the spring of 2003, Linda Fox saw Dr. Jackson for pain in her 
right knee and was diagnosed with arthritis in her right knee. An x-ray showed that a 
portion of the cartilage in the knee joint was missing. Dr. Jackson told Linda that she 
would have to have her knee replaced sometime in the future, but to put it off as long a 
possible. Dr. Jackson did not restrict Linda's activities. (Record p. 924, Bench Trial 
Transcript p. 23; Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record p. 467, 466.) 
Fact No. 2. On April 20, 2004, Linda purchased a ticket to Women's Conference 
in the Harman Building on the campus of the Defendant. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, 
Record 082, pp. 082-083.) 
Fact No. 3. As Linda left the Harman Building, she descended the west 
stairway. The steps were narrow such that the ball of her foot overhung the metal 
nosings on the front edge of each step. Near the bottom of the stairway, as she stepped 
down, she heard the metal nosing clatter as she stepped onto it, she felt the metal nosing 
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move under her foot, she saw her foot slip off the nosing, and she saw her right foot 
come out from underneath her. She fell in a twisting, sitting fashion onto the stairway 
with her right leg under her. She felt intense pain and was unable to move her leg from 
underneath her. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 467-464; Affidavit of Linda 
Fox, Record 083, pp. 082-081.) 
Fact No. 4. Linda did not feel any unusual pain or discomfort in her right knee 
as she descended the stairway until after her fall. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 
p. 465.) 
Fact No. 5. At the time of her fall, Linda's knee was not unstable and did not 
prevent her from carrying on an active routine that included using stairs, housework, 
exercise, and part-time employment in retail sales and as a cafeteria lunch worker 
during which she was required to carry loads up to 60 pounds. (Bench Trial Transcript, 
Record 924, pp. 23-24; Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 466; Affidavit of Linda 
Fox, Record 081, 84) 
Fact No. 6. It was the loose and worn condition of the metal nosing that caused 
Linda to fall and not the condition of her knee. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 
464) 
Fact No. 7. At the scene of her fall, Linda reportedly said to EMT Noah 
Converse that her knee went out as she was going down the stairs. (Affidavit of Noah 
Converse, Record 269, p. 267; Utah EMS Incident Report, Record p. 262) 
Fact No. 8, Linda doesn't remember specifically what she said to the EMTs 
assisting her, but after her foot slipped off the step and her body twisted and she felt 
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severe pain in her knee, her knee would not support her and she could not walk. 
(Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 465-464) 
Fact No. 9. Linda was not given a copy of her statement reported by the EMTs 
as required by Utah Code 78-27-33, as amended. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, 
p. 465, f 7; Bench Trial Transcript, Record 924, p. 61) 
Fact No. 10. Linda was transported by the EMTs to the emergency room at Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center where she was treated for a broken leg by the 
imposition of an external fixator. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 083, p. 081; Bench 
Trial Transcript, Record 924, Transcript pp. 15-16) 
Fact No. 11. After 11 weeks, her leg was healed and the fixator was removed. 
(Bench Trial transcript, Record 924, Transcript p. 16) 
Fact No. 12. The Plaintiffs incurred and paid medical expenses in the sum of 
approximately $34,000.00. (Statement of Damages, Record 0773, p. 0772; Summary of 
Charges and Payments, Addendum no. 11; Bench Trial Transcript 924, Transcript pp. 
16-17, 27; Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits, Record 728, 727, Tab 2) 
Fact No. 13. The Plaintiffs stipulated that they would not call an expert witness 
in support of their claims. (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine, 
Record 883; Bench Trial Transcript, Record 924, Transcript pp. 13-24.) 
Fact No. 14. The Defendant did not replace any of the metal nosings prior to 
Linda's fall. (Affidavit of William Trapp, Record 274; Affidavit of Kendall Wilson, 
Record 278; Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, 
Interrogatory Nos. 11 and 22, Addendum no. 10.) 
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Fact No. 15. The Defendant did not give Linda notice of the defective 
conditions on the stairway. (Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' First Request for 
Admissions, Addendum no. 9, Request No. 31; Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 083, 
082 H3) 
Fact No. 16. Loose metal plates were dangerous. (Email between Tom Overson 
and Wayne Lott, dated August 23, 2003, Record 208, Defendant Brigham Young 
University's Exhibit List, Exhibit 80, Record 644, 639) 
Fact No. 17. In the summer of 2003, the Defendant determined that the stairway 
needed to be replaced; costs estimates were submitted to administration on December 5, 
2003 (Record p. 0202), and a contract awarded April 7, 2004 (Record p. 0201). The 
contract was actually signed by the Defendant on April 20, 2004, the date of the Linda's 
fall, and by the contractor on April 22, 2004, two days later. (Defendant's Answers to 
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Addendum no. 10, Interrogatory No. 20; Brigham 
Young University Short Form Contract No. 5332, Addendum no. 6) 
Fact No. 18. Within two weeks of Linda's fall, the Defendant tore down the 
stairway and commenced rebuilding the stairway. (Affidavit of Joseph Fox, Record 
075, H35) 
Fact No. 19. The Defendant did not preserve any of the metal nosings. 
(Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs Second Request for Production of Documents, 
Record 419, 418, Request No. 1) 
Fact No. 20. Between April 20, 2004 and April 30, 2004, the Plaintiff Joseph 
Fox inspected and photographed the stairway where Linda had fallen. (Affidavit of 
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Joseph Fox, Record 075, pp. 075-052) 
Fact No. 21. On April 28, 2004, David Lawrence, of the defendant's Office of 
Risk Management, photographed and inspected the stairway where the plaintiff 
reportedly fell and reported: "My inspection of the stairs shows some deterioration in 
the cement and some of the wide metal walk strips (on the edge of each step) make a 
clack noise when you step on them. They seem flush with the step but have missing 
screws so they aren't tight to the cement. Nothing I saw concerning the above seemed 
to be a noteworthy hazard and none near the area, I was shown by custodial, she was 
thought to have fallen. 
"However, the edges of the metal strips, which form the edge of each stair, 
seemed worn down to me and allowed slipping if one had one's weight on them. I 
wouldn't say they were slick per se, but they were slicker than the cement they were 
attached to. I don't know yet, but they appear to have had a pattern on them originally 
(20 years old?) but has now worn down. I am concerned that there were no railing 
options other than at the far edges of these quite wide stairs." (Defendant Brigham 
Young University's Exhibit List, Exhibit 121, Record 644, 637, Claim Detail with 
Notes, dated April 26, 2004; Record 728, Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Exhibits, 
Tab 12, Claim Detail with Notes, dated April 26, 2004, and Exhibit A, Tab 12, 
Addendum, no. 12) 
Fact No. 22. The Defendant withdrew its proffer of medical records in support 
of its claim that Linda's knee was a material factor in her fall. (Bench Trial Transcript, 
Record 924, Transcript pp. 43-47) 
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Fact No. 23. The Defendant relied solely on the EMTs statements with regard to 
its claims that Linda's pre-existing condition was a material factor in her fall. (Bench 
Trial Transcript, Record 924, Transcript pp. 43-47) 
Fact No. 24. Defendant denied that its EMT personnel made a written report 
regarding the services rendered Linda Fox. (Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs First 
Request for Admissions, Addendum no. 9, Request 20.) 
Fact No. 25. Argument of Counsel for Defendant that Linda's knee was a 
material factor in her fall. (Bench Trial Transcript, Record 924, Transcript pp. 11-12) 
Fact No. 26. Only one documented repair and several undocumented repairs 
were made to the stairway between August 2003 and April 20, 2004. (Affidavit of 
William Trapp, Record 274; Affidavit of Kendall Wilson, Record 278) 
Fact No. 27. The stairway was routinely inspected. (Affidavit of William Trapp, 
Record 274, pp. 272-271) 
Fact No. 28. Utah Code §78-27-33 was amended in 1998 by the Utah 
Legislature to change the wording from "law enforcement officer" to "peace officer". 
Fact No. 29. According to the Defendant, Linda fell higher up on the stairway 
(Claim Detail with Notes, Addendum no. 12; Affidavit of Noah Converse, Record 269, 
p. 266, If 14-16) 
Fact No. 30. According to Linda, she fell 2 or 3 steps from the bottom of the 
stairway. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 083, p. 082-081, % and p. 078) 
Fact No. 31. The EMTs lifted Linda into a wheelchair at the bottom of the 
stairway. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, Record 467, p. 465, %6) 
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Fact No. 32. No one marked the exact location of Linda's fall. (Affidavit of 
Linda Fox, Record 467, p. 465, %6; Claim Detail with Notes, Addendum no. 12) 
Fact No 33. A man, later identified as George Talbot, told Linda Fox that a year 
before he had fallen on the stairs and had broken his arm. (Affidavit of Linda Fox, 
Record 467, p. 465, %6; Defendant Brigham Young University's Exhibit List, Exhibit 
79, Record 644, p. 640; Supervisor Report of Accident, August 25, 2003, Addendum 
no. 7) 
Fact No. 34. Witness subpoenaed for trial by Plaintiffs: George Talbot, Record 
p. 669; Wayne Lott, Record p. 657; Ed Cozzens, Record p. 713; Jon Overman, Record 
p. 693; Kendall Wilson, Record p. 651; William Trapp, Record p. 708; 
Summary of Arguments 
Linda Fox fell on the west stairway of the Harman Building on the Defendant's 
campus after purchasing a ticket to Women's Conference 2004 and broke her leg and 
incurred medical expenses of approximately $34,000.00. Linda's fall was caused by a 
defective metal step nosing that was worn and loose. The Defendant had notice of the 
defective conditions on the stairway as early as August 2003, and had decided that 
summer to replace the stairway. Despite having decided to replace the stairway, the 
Defendant did not give the Plaintiff notice of its dangerously defective conditions. The 
stairway was not replaced until shortly after Linda's fall. 
The Plaintiff Linda Fox suffered from arthritis in her right knee resulting in some 
missing cartilage. However her condition did not alter her daily routine, which 
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included regular exercise and two part-time employments requiring prolonged standing 
and carrying loads up to 60 pounds. There was no evidence that her knee was unstable. 
The Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's decision, sitting as the trier of fact, not to 
take testimony in the trial of the above matter because the Plaintiffs did not have an 
expert witness to testify that Linda's arthritic knee was not a material factor in her fall. 
Further, the court would not take testimony because the Plaintiffs did not have an expert 
witness to testify that the treatment Linda received for her broken leg was reasonable 
and necessary, even though the Plaintiffs had paid for the medical services. 
The Plaintiffs contend that they can establish a prima facie case for negligence 
relying solely on lay testimony. 
In some cases, expert testimony is required when causation involves knowledge, 
facts and conclusions beyond one's common experience. However, a lay person may 
testify according to her perceptions and draw conclusions therefrom even though an 
expert could so testify, as long as such facts and conclusions do not require specialized 
knowledge or experience. 
This is a prosaic slip and fall case where the issues are uncomplicated and 
straightforward. 
In this case Linda is competent to testify concerning the manner of her fall as she 
descended the west stairway. She can testify that when she stepped down onto the 
worn and loose metal nosing, she heard the nosing clatter and felt it move under her 
foot; that she saw her foot come out from underneath her off the step, and that her left 
leg swung over her right leg as she fell in a twisting, sitting fashion on the stairway. 
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Further she is competent to testify that she felt severe pain in her right leg and that she 
could not move her right leg from underneath her. The facts of her fall, the pain she 
experienced , and the injuries she suffered are all well within the knowledge and 
experience of a lay person. Nearly everyone has had some experience with a broken 
bone. 
After her fall, Linda was transported to the Emergency Room at Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center where she was treated for a broken leg. Her bones were 
immobilized using a surgical pin and an external fixator which she wore for about 11 
weeks until the bones were healed, whereupon the fixator was surgically removed. 
These medical procedures are common for a broken leg like the one Linda suffered. 
The only evidence that Linda's arthritic knee was a factor in her fall is that Linda 
admitted to the condition and that she reportedly said to the EMTs assisting her that her 
leg came out from underneath her. The Plaintiffs dispute the statement and objected to 
the introduction of the statements under the provisions of Utah Code §78-27-33, as 
amended. The Court ruled that the statute had been impliedly repealed and admitted the 
statement. Further, the Court ruled, that in the absence of expert testimony to the 
contrary, it could only speculate as to the cause of Linda's fall, and accordingly 
dismissed the Plaintiffs case. 
The Plaintiffs paid approximately $34,000.00 for Linda's treatment. 
The Plaintiffs contend in this appeal that Linda's statement should not have been 
admitted. But even if admitted, the combination of the bare fact that she suffered a pre-
existing condition and her statement that her leg came out from underneath her do not 
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outweigh her testimony concerning the facts surrounding her fall. The Defendant takes 
the Plaintiff where it finds her. If her pre-existing condition was aggravated by her foot 
slipping off the defective step, the Defendant is still liable for her injuries. 
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that if a negligent act were deemed wrongful 
because that act increased the chances that a particular type of accident would occur, 
and a mishap of that very sort did happen, this is enough to support a finding by the 
trier of fact that the negligent behavior caused the harm. 
Moreover, where a strong causal link exists, it is up to the negligent party to 
bring in evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that the wrongful conduct had 
not been a substantial factor. 
Since there is a strong causal link between the Defendant's negligence in 
maintaining the stairway and Linda's fall, and it is the very type of accident that could 
happen on a poorly maintained stairway, the burden was placed on the Defendant to 
come forward with evidence suggesting that some other cause was a material factor. 
The Defendant's bald assertion that it was Linda's pre-existing condition does not meet 
this standard. In fact, the only way that the Defendant could assert that Linda's pre-
existing condition were the "other cause", would be through expert testimony, since 





Generally, this appeal concerns to what extent plaintiffs may rely on lay 
testimony in presenting a prima facie negligence claim resulting from a slip and fall 
accident where the Plaintiff Linda Fox had a pre-existing arthritic condition in her knee 
which did not limit her activity, and she was otherwise healthy. The plaintiffs assert that 
it was a defective metal nosing of the Defendant's steps that caused Linda's fall, not her 
pre-existing condition. The Defense had no medical evidence that her pre-existing 
condition contributed to her fall. This appeal is important because unless the plaintiffs 
are able to rely on lay testimony for their prima facie case, the costs of using expert 
witnesses in the litigation, as required by the trial court, will exceed the claimed 
damages, and the plaintiffs will be compelled to abandon their otherwise legitimate 
claims. See Choi v. Anvil, 32 P.3d 1, 3 (Alaska 2001). 
Context of Decision 
Prior to taking testimony on the date set for trial, the trial court heard oral 
arguments from the Defendant and the Plaintiffs on the Defendant's motion to exclude 
expert testimony on the issues of causation and damages. The plaintiffs stipulated that 
they would not call expert witnesses and instead intended to rely solely on lay 
testimony. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that because of Linda's pre-existing 
condition, without expert testimony adducing that her condition was not a material 
factor in her fall, the plaintiffs' claims would fail, and the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' 
complaint, presumably under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Scope of Lay Testimony 
The boundary line for lay testimony was set forth in the recent case of State v. 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 (Utah 09/08/2006). There the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that lay fact testimony has always been a primary, acceptable source of evidence in our 
system. Accordingly, lay fact testimony need not satisfy rule 701 or 702 but is 
admissible so long as it complies with other portions of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
including the relevancy rules in Article IV and rule 602's requirement that a witness 
have personal knowledge of the matter about which he or she is testifying. Id. ^36. 
However, the Court held that lay fact testimony cannot cross the line into regions where 
specialized knowledge or experience is the basis for the testimony. Id. ^[37. 
In determining the line for lay testimony the Court held that the distinction must 
be based on the level of knowledge that witnesses have from which they can draw their 
conclusions. As long as that testimony does not require scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge, it is within the ken of the average bystander and admissible 
from a lay witness. In other words, the average bystander could provide the testimony 
Id. 134. 
The Court went on to state that a common-sense inquiry was required of whether 
a juror would be able to understand the evidence without specialized knowledge. Id. 
TJ33. Accordingly, just because a fact may be established scientifically, does not mean 
that an expert can be the only witness. Facts and conclusions that may be drawn by any 
average bystander may be provided by non-expert testimony. Id. %35. 
31 
The line for lay testimony is demonstrated in Beard v. K-Mart, 12 P.3d 1015, 
2000 UT App 285. Darlene Beard was injured when a K-Mart employee 
unintentionally struck her in the head with his elbow. The next day Darlene went to a 
doctor complaining of head, neck, knee, and foot pain. She eventually underwent 
surgeries on her neck and wrists and K-Mart objected that the surgeries were not 
causally connected to the accident in its store. 
K-Mart argued that although Beard testified her neck and wrist problems began 
at the time of her injury at K-Mart, her belief that her neck and wrist surgeries were, 
therefore, the result of that incident cannot overcome the failure of the medical 
evidence to substantiate that belief. Id. [^11. 
The Court reasoned that the question is not whether the accident at K-Mart 
caused Beard injury, but rather whether injuries sustained as a result of the accident at 
K-Mart required the neurological surgeries performed on Beard's neck and wrists. 
Beard was properly permitted to testify that the accident in the store caused pain and 
injury. The question as to whether such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within 
the common knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and could properly be 
submitted to the jury. What is missing in the evidence, however, is the link between the 
injuries suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, in all but the most obvious 
cases, testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need for specific medical treatment is 
inadequate to submit the issue to the jury, (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) 
Certainly whether the need for complex neurological surgery was a result of the 
accident at K-Mart is not within the common experience of laypersons. As stated in 
32 
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986): the need for 
positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendants1 negligent 
act and the plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the injury. Where the injury 
involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, 
necessitating speculation in making a finding, there must be expert testimony that the 
negligent act probably caused the injury. Beard, f 16. 
Other states have reached similar conclusions with regard to lay testimony. For 
example in Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services Company, Inc., 137 Idaho 
838, 54 P.3d 954 (Idaho App. 09/11/2002), Ruth Dodge-Farrar injured her knee, ankle 
and back when she slipped on the defendants floor. In considering Ruth's testimony 
regarding her fall and the injuries she sustained, the Idaho Court ruled: When alleged 
injuries are of a common nature and arise from a readily identifiable cause, there is no 
need for the injured party to produce expert testimony. Choi v. Anvil, 32 P.3d 1, 3 
(Alaska 2001). Requiring expert testimony in all such cases would needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation, discourage injured persons from bringing small but legitimate 
claims, and also burden defendants who might feel compelled to hire their own experts 
in response. Id. 
The Idaho Court reasoned, that a layperson may testify to the causation of 
medical symptoms or of injuries where such causation is within the usual and ordinary 
experience of the average person. For example, if a person fell down some steps, 
landing on a knee, and immediately thereafter felt pain in the knee, saw an open wound 
on the knee, and within minutes or hours observed that the knee was swelling, that lay 
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person could provide reliable testimony that the pain, wound and swelling were caused 
by the fall. A layperson could also testify that medical care obtained to treat those 
immediate symptoms was causally related to the fall. As the claimed symptoms and 
treatment become more separated in time from the fall, however, the causal relationship 
becomes more doubtful and tenuous, and expert testimony becomes necessary to 
establish causation. As time passes, the possibility that prior or subsequent injuries or 
unrelated disease processes may play a causal role makes lay opinion unreliable and 
inadequate to sustain a claim. Accordingly, lay testimony on causation must be limited 
to the symptoms which are proximate enough to the injury that lay opinion can be 
deemed competent and reliable. Just where within the time continuum the line must be 
drawn to exclude lay testimony is necessarily a decision committed to the trial court's 
discretion based upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In addition, 
even as to symptoms that appear immediately after the traumatic event, lay opinions 
may be foreclosed if the causation question is not a matter within the common 
knowledge and experience of the average person. Thus, in the foregoing hypothetical, a 
layperson might be precluded from testifying that a skin rash which appeared on her 
arms immediately after the fall was causally related to the fall. 
Also, in Byrd v. Delasancha, 195 S.W.3d 834 (Tex.App. Dist.5 06/27/2006), the 
Texas Court set a similar standard. Byrd sustained soft-tissue injuries from an auto 
accident. Byrd did not offer expert medical testimony to support the causal relationship 
between the accident and the injuries. The Texas Court ruled that to establish causatiori 
in a personal injury case, a plaintiff must prove the conduct of the defendant caused an 
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event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable injuries. See 
Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. 1984). The causal nexus 
between the event sued on and the plaintiffs injuries must be shown by competent 
evidence. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 732. Lay testimony is adequate to prove 
causation if general experience and common sense will enable a lay person to determine 
the causal relationship between the event and the condition with reasonable probability. 
See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 733; Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 
703, 706 (Tex. 1970); Parker v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 46 
(Tex. 1969). In areas of common experience, a jury should generally be entitled to 
decide causation with or without medical testimony. See Fid. & Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters, Inc. v. La Rochelle, 587 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1979, writ 
dism'd). Generally, lay testimony establishing a sequence of events which provides a 
strong, logically traceable connection between the event and the condition is sufficient 
proof of causation. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 733. In such cases, lay testimony can 
provide both legally and factually sufficient evidence to prove the causal relationship. 
See Blankenship v. Mirick, 984 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied). 
The fact that the testimony of causation comes from the injured party alone does not 
prevent it from having probative force if given credit by the jury. See Fid. & Guar. Ins., 
587 S.W.2d at 497. Byrd, supra 837-838. 
Additional authorities 
Choi v. Anvil, 32 P.3d 1, 3 (Alaska 09/07/2001) Our case law requires expert 
testimony only when the nature or character of a person's injuries require the special 
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skill of an expert to help present the evidence to the trier of fact in a comprehensible 
format. In Houger v. Houger, we considered an argument that an expert was necessary 
to establish that an injured worker was medically unfit for work. We rejected that 
argument, noting that "there are numerous . . . matters involving health and bodily 
soundness, not exclusively within the domain of medical science, upon which the 
ordinary experience of everyday life is entirely sufficient.. We have since affirmed this 
principle and required expert medical testimony to establish a causal connection only 
where there is no reasonably apparent (as distinguished from obvious) causal 
relationship between the event demonstrated and the result sought to be proved." 
Additional references distinguished in Beard, supra, are relevant and contain 
similar statements regarding the admissibility of lay testimony: 
In Jordan v. Smoot, 380 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), the plaintiff sued 
the defendant for injuries she sustained in an automobile collision. See 380 S.E.2d at 
714. Her case consisted of "her testimony and that of the responding police officer, 
pictures of her damaged car, and her medical bill." Id. The plaintiff testified that she 
visited a chiropractor the day of the accident and following the accident and that the 
chiropractic treatments had given her relief. See id. The trial court directed a verdict for 
the defendant "on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie personal 
injury case because she had not introduced expert medical testimony" connecting the 
collision and her injuries. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, stating "where, as 
here, there is no significant lapse of time between the injury sustained and the onset of 
the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury 
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sustained is a matter which jurors must be credited with knowing by reason of common 
knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required." Id. (emphasis added). Beard, 
114. In Walton v. Gallbraith, 166 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969), in Walton, 
the plaintiff sued the defendant for neck, back, and shoulder injuries caused by a car accident. 
See id. at 605. At trial, no physician testified for the plaintiff, and the defendant "objected to 
the admission into evidence of bills for medicine and treatment on the ground that there was no 
showing that they were causally connected with the . . . accident." Id. The defendant also 
requested an instruction to exclude the jury's consideration of the bills. See id. The trial court 
denied both motions, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $3500 in damages. See id. On appeal, 
the defendant argued it was error to introduce plaintiffs medical bills. See id. The plaintiff, on 
the other hand, argued "that a causal connection between the accident and the injury may be 
shown without expert testimony." Id. at 605-06. The court stated: a brief review of the 
function of the jury leads us to the conclusion that plaintiffs position is the correct one. Her 
testimony emphasizes the facts that there were no previous neck or back pains and that they 
began the day after the accident. In a situation such as this, it should be clear to men of 
common experience that the cause of the injuries was the accident and no expert was needed to 
demonstrate this fact. Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Beard, f 15. 
In Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), 
The Washington Court observed, when the results of an alleged act of negligence are 
within the experience and observation of an ordinary lay person, the trier of fact can 
draw a conclusion as to the causal link without resort to medical testimony. Bennett; 
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Carrado, 92 Wash. 2d 631, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979). Of course, 
37 
the injured person is competent to testify as to her past and present condition. The 
weight of such testimony is for the jury. 
Therefore, contrary to Court's findings (A), (C), and (E), and the related 
conclusions (A), (B), and (C), above, that Linda could only testify that she descended 
the stairway and fell; that Linda fell without the physical intervention of any actor; and 
that Linda does not know where she fell, Linda is competent to testify according to 
Facts No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 30, 31, 32, and 33, as stated above and 
taken from the record. These facts are within the scope of Linda's personal knowledge 
and are not based on any specialized knowledge or experience. These are facts that any 
victim of an accident could testify to as a lay witness. These facts provide factual 
support for the Plaintiffs' prima facie case for duty, breach, causation and damages. 
Specifically, with respect to (C) Linda is competent to testify that her foot 
slipped off a defective metal nosing and she fell. And the Court did not rule out the 
possibility that the stairway was the cause of Linda's fall. (Record p. 924, Bench Trial 
Transcript, pp. 64-65) The argued dilemma facing the Court was which of two 
plausible arguments to accept: that the stairway caused the fall or Linda's pre-existing 
condition caused the fall, (id.) These alternatives will be addressed later. 
With respect to finding (D) above, that "no person inspected the stairs after 
Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition of the stair Linda Fox was on when 
she allegedly fell", the Facts Nos. 20 and 21, above* are undisputed. Both Joseph Fox 
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and David Lawrence inspected the stairs after Linda's fall. Although neither individual 
was identified as an expert, both were competent to testify as lay witnesses to what they 
observed on the stairway and their conclusions, as long as their testimony was not based 
on specialized knowledge and training. For example, David could testify that the 
nosings were missing screws and not tight to the cement; that the nosing made noise 
when stepped on; that the nosings moved under foot; that the nosing were worn; that the 
edge of the nosings were worn down and allowed slipping if one had one's weight on 
them, and that the nosings were slicker than the cement. (See Addendum no. 12) These 
are observations any person could make when viewing the stairway. By the same 
standard, Joseph Fox could testify that he inspected the stairway and made similar 
observations as reported in his affidavit at Fact 20. Furthermore, Joseph demonstrated 
the general deterioration of the stairway by taking photographs of the steps, both in the 
vicinity of where Linda claims she fell and where the Defendant claims she fell, and 
when he lifted up one of the metal nosing to show that it was not attached to the 
stairway. Accordingly, both David and Joseph are competent to testify as to what they 
observed and reported concerning the condition of the stairway. These facts are direct 
and circumstantial evidence of the defective condition of the stairway and of location 
where Linda fell and support the Plaintiffs' prima facie case for duty, breach, and 
causation. The importance of these observations is heightened by the fact that shortly 
after Linda's fall, the Defendant destroyed all evidence of the condition of the stairway 
at the time of Linda's fall. (Fact No. 19) 
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Furthermore, Plaintiffs' subpoenaed witnesses William Trapp, George Talbott, 
Wayne Lott, Ed Cozzens, Jon Overman, and Kendall Wilson, see Fact Nos. 16, 17, 18, 
26, all employees or agents of the Defendant, could give further testimony concerning 
the condition of the stairs before Linda fell on them as well as the Defendant's 
knowledge of the dangerous conditions on the stairway and the Defendant's attempts to 
repair and ultimately to rebuild the stairway. The documentary and oral testimony 
provided by these witnesses supports the Plaintiffs' prima facie case for duty, breach, 
and causation, including notice to the Defendant of the defective conditions on the 
stairway and the reasonableness of the Defendant's attempts to repair the stairway. 
The Plaintiffs agree with the Court's finding (B) above. However, the Plaintiffs 
contend that given the clear weight of the evidence that Linda's pre-existing condition 
did not adversely affect her life style, that the stairs were in disrepair, and that a 
defective metal nosing caused Linda to fall, shifted the burden to the Defendant to come 
forward with expert testimony ruling out the probability that the defective metal nosing 
was not the cause of her fall and that her fall was caused by her pre-existing condition. 
Defendant's unadorned assertion that Linda's knee was the cause of her fall is merely a 
technically hypothetical assertion without the foundation of expert testimony and does 
not require rebutting evidence from the Plaintiffs. 
As noted earlier, the Court identified two plausible causes for the Linda's fall: 
the defective stairway or her pre-existing condition. The Court ruled that she carried 
the burden of proving that her condition was not the cause of her fall. (Record p. 924, 
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Trial Transcript pp. 65-66) 
The only evidence before the Court that Linda's pre-existing condition was the 
cause of her fall was her alleged statement to the EMTs that her leg gave out and her 
acknowledgment that she had an arthritic knee. See Fact Nos. 1, 7, 8, and 9. 
The fact that Linda had an arthritic knee is not evidence that her knee caused her 
to fall. There was no evidence before the Court that an arthritic knee could cause a 
person to fall, especially a person who had not fallen before and who led an active life 
style which included daily exercise, use of stairs, and working two part-time 
employments which required standing and lifting loads up to 60 pounds. Furthermore, 
her statement, if she made it at all, to the EMTs was inadmissible under Utah Code §78-
27-33, as amended. 
Proximate cause is generally defined as '"that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury 
and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one 
that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."' Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 
479, 482 n.3 (Utah 1984)); accord Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 
482,486 (Utah App. 1991), aff d, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
In the case of Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 2002 UT 115, ffif 87-88 (Utah 
11/26/2002), the Utah Supreme Court citing Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 
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389-391 (2d Cir. 03/20/1998), ruled who bears the causal burden that "[I]t is well 
established that causation 'may be proved by circumstantial evidence,' . . . Drawing 
upon opinions of Chief Judge Cardozo in New York and Chief Justice Traynor in 
California, the court concluded: [I]f (a) a negligent act was deemed wrongful because 
that act increased the chances that a particular type of accident would occur, and (b) a 
mishap of that very sort did happen, this was enough to support a finding by the trier of 
fact that the negligent behavior caused the harm. Id. at 390. The court further noted that 
"[w]here such a strong causal link exists, it is up to the negligent party to bring in 
evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that in the actual case the wrongful 
conduct had not been a substantial factor." Id. at 390-91. In the instant case, AGFA'S 
safety specifications mandated ten complete room air exchanges per hour precisely to 
reduce the risk of toxic chemical exposure. The alleged harm occurred in the absence of 
adequate air exchange. Under the reasoning of Zachowicz, this alone is sufficient to 
support causation and AGFA bears the burden of refuting the presumption of "but for" 
causation. 
Individuals routinely feel the effects of a wide array of common phenomena 
whose mechanisms remain unexplained by science, including, for example, the law of 
gravity, the nature of light, the source of personality, and the process of cell 
differentiation. If a bicyclist falls and breaks his arm, causation is assumed without 
argument because of the temporal relationship between the accident and the injury. The 
law does not object that no one measured the exact magnitude and angle of the forces 
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applied to the bone. Courts do not exclude all testimony regarding the fall because the 
mechanism of gravity remains undiscovered. Legally, an observable sequence of 
condition — -> event —> altered condition, has been found sufficient to establish 
causation even when the exact mechanism is unknown. Therefore, we hold that 
Technicians enjoy the same opportunity to prove that which they can, as do the victims 
of more prosaic injuries. Alder, f^ 88. 
The Plaintiffs do not have to eliminate all possible causes for Linda's fall. In 
Williams v. KFC National Management Co., 391 F.3d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) the New York Court found that Williams was injured when 
she slipped and fell on a greasy sidewalk. She claimed the grease came from a KFC 
dumpster that crossed the sidewalk. There was only circumstantial evidence that the 
grease came from the dumpster. Under New York law, Williams was not required to 
adduce the most reasonable explanation for the accident, nor was she required to 
eliminate all other possible causes for her fall. To establish a prima facie case of 
negligence based wholly on circumstantial evidence, "[i]t is enough that [plaintiff] 
shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the 
causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred." The law does 
not require that plaintiffs proof "positively exclude every other possible cause" of the 
accident but defendant's negligence. Rather, her proof must render those other causes 
sufficiently "remote" or "technical" to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not 
upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
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Linda's fall on the stairs, her broken leg, and the medical treatment she received 
was one continuous event, or following the reasoning of Zachowicz: the Defendant had 
allowed its stairway to fall into disrepair increasing the likelihood that someone would 
fall. If fact over a period of eight months at least two people fell on the stairs. (Fact 
Nos. 3 and 33) When Linda started down the stairs her leg wasn't broken, while on the 
stairs she slipped and fell on a dangerous step, after she fell her leg was broken, and she 
immediately received medical treatment. The causal relationship linking her fall with 
her broken leg and the consequent medical treatment are all temporally connected and 
well within the common knowledge and experience of a lay person, as such they do not 
require expert testimony to link them together, and the plaintiffs should be allowed to 
so testify. Furthermore, because of the strong causal link between the defective 
conditions on the stairway, her fall and the injuries she suffered, the burden is on the 
Defendant to "bring in evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that in the actual 
case the wrongful conduct had not been a substantial factor." (Alder, supra, f 86) 
Applying the foregoing facts and rules to the Conclusions of Law, the Trial 
Court erred in concluding that no witness could testify as to the condition of the stairs. 
The Court based this conclusion solely on the fact that the Plaintiffs were not going to 
call an expert witness. But, as pointed out earlier, the Plaintiffs and well as the 
Plaintiffs' subpoenaed witnesses were all competent to testify as to the condition of the 
stairs. Also, the conclusion that no witness could testify that the stairs were dangerous 
is in err. It is common knowledge that a person can slip and fall on a worn and unsound 
surface, especially in the absence of hand rails. The factual and legal conclusion that 
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the stairs were dangerous was for the Court to decide once it heard the evidence, and 
the Plaintiffs were entitled to produce their evidence using lay testimony. It was then 
up to the Defendant to come forward with evidence that the stairs were not the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries. 
With respect to medical damages, the plaintiffs are competent to testify to 
medical expenses that they paid from their personal knowledge. Again the only basis 
for the Court's finding and conclusion in this regard, Conclusion (D), above, was the 
absence of expert testimony. The Utah Court of Appeal has decided in Stevenett v. 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 977 P.2d 508, 1999 UT App 80, ^[31, that expert testimony is not 
required to lay a foundation for medical bills and that the Plaintiffs were competent to 
do so, especially where the Plaintiffs had paid the bills. The Court found that payment 
was some evidence that the charges were reasonable and necessary. 
Utah Code $78-27-33 
The Trial Court held that Utah Code §78-27-33, as amended, was impliedly 
repealed because it conflicted with Rule 803(4), Utah Rules of Evidence. (Record 924, 
Bench Trial Transcript, pp. 53-55, 63-64). In the Court's order, however, the 
Defendant changed the ruling to apply the court's reasoning to Rule 801(2), (Record 
911-907) which was not argued before the court. The Plaintiffs assume that the Court 
was made aware of this change when it signed the order. Therefore, in the interests of 
expediency, the Plaintiffs present their arguments in relation to Rule 801(2). 
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In Board of Education of Jordan School District v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 
234, 2004 UT 37, f 9 (Utah 05/04/2004), the Utah Supreme Court set forth certain rules 
for determining whether a statute was impliedly repealed. 
Pursuant to our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain 
language to determine its meaning. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130, f21, 
63 P.3d 705. "We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." 
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ [17, 66 P.3d 592; see also Perrine v. Kennecott Mining 
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) ("[S]tatutory enactments are to be so construed 
as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." (citation and quotation 
omitted)); Bus. Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994) 
("[TJerms of a statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a 
piecemeal fashion." (citation and quotation omitted)); Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 
P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) ("It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to 
give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it into serious 
conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid 
conflicts."). In addition, "[i]t is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable 
and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or 
unreasonable result." State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 
313 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
Utah Code §78-27-36, provides that the rights provided by this act are intended 
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to be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or 
provisions otherwise existing in the law. 
The intent of the Legislature in enacting subsection 33 is expressed in subsection 
36 and shows that subsection 33 was not intended to conflict with the rules of evidence. 
The Legislature amended subsection 33 in 1998 to change "law enforcement officer" to 
"peace officer". It is clear from that amendment that in 1998, the Legislature did not 
deem the statute to be impliedly repealed by the order of the Supreme Court on 
September 10, 1985, as decided by the Trial Court. (Record, p. 909) I believe that it is 
safe to assume that legislative counsel was aware of the Supreme Court's order. 
When subsection 33 is read in conjunction with Rule 801(2) it is clear that 
subsection 33 is foundational and not inconsistent and speaks to a policy that favors an 
injured person who may be at a disadvantage before her potential opponent. The 
subsection merely lays a foundation on which certain statements are admissible as a 
policy of law. 
Rule 801(2) provides in part that a statement is not hearsay if the statement is 
offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth... . 
An injured person's statement is not admissible under the rule, not because it 
would or would not be hearsay, but because as a matter of policy, a person under the 
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stress of an injury should not be held to statements she may make to a potential 
opposing party. The rule helps level the playing field. The rule errors in favor of the 
injured party, who at the time, may be at the mercy of the opposing party or its agents. 
The rule is limited in scope so that once the injured party has regained her senses, she 
can be held to statements against her interest on the same playing field as any other 
person. Subparagraph (B) by its terms provides for an adoption of the statement. 
Subsection 33 provides the method for implementing subparagraph (B). 
Furthermore, §§ 78-27-32, 34, 35, and 36 and illustrative of this public policy in 
protecting injured persons from potentially aggressive opponents. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Plaintiffs are competent to testify to facts within their personal 
knowledge and to conclusions based thereon that do not require expertise. Under this 
standard, the Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case for causation and damages 
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the Trial Court. Therefore, the Plaintiffs 
pray that the Court of Appeal set aside the Trial Court's judgment of dismissal and 
remand the this case for trial. 
Dated, April 13, 2007 
/ Joseph R. Fox / Linda A. Fox 
^ Plaintiff Plaintiff 
48 
ADDENDUM 
Document Title Document No. 
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice 1 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 2 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Objections to Testimony 3 
Wayne Lott email to Tom Oveson 4 
Cost Estimate 5 
BYU Short Form Contract 6 
Supervisor's Report of Accident 7 
Utah EMS Incident Report 8 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions .. 9 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories 10 
Summary of Charges and Payments 11 
Claim Detail with Notes 12 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellants Brief was 
mailed by first class mail this date to the following: Thomas W. Seiler, Attorney for 
Defendant, PO Box 1266, 2500 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84603-1266. 
Dated: April 13, 2007 
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COPY 
Thomas W. Seller, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does, 
hereby, grant the Defendant's oral motion to dismiss and dismisses the Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
causes of action therein, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant, with prejudice and 
upon the merits. 
DATED this ^ day of \Jez^ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/FRED D.HOWARD 
JUDGE FRED D. HOWARD 
Fourth District Court 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
iz/i2./b6 flffi Deputy 
COPY 
Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, 
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present in person and appeared pro se. The Defendant was present 
and represented by its counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, 
and David B. Thomas, Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University. Certain evidence 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
\Z./\2./6C m\ Deputy 
was proffered. The parties advised the Court fully in the premises and does, hereby, enter the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs allege that the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was injured on April 20,2004, when 
she fell on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the 
stairs") as she descended the stairs. 
2. The Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case without any expert witness of any kind 
on any subject, including but not limited to: 
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and 
b. Mrs. Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 20,2004. 
3. In the Spring of 2003, Linda A. Fox had been told by Dr. Richard Jackson that Linda 
would require a future knee replacement. (Linda Fox deposition, p. 16: 11-14.) 
4. In the Spring of 2003, Dr. Richard Jackson had x-rayed Linda Fox's right knee and 
reported to her that her right knee was missing cartilage and diagnosed Linda Fox with an arthritic 
knee. (Linda Fox deposition, p. 17:6; Affidavit of Linda Fox, April 7,2005, \2 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Fox Affidavit.") 
5. On April 20, 2004, Linda Fox told the Emergency Medical Service volunteers who 
attended to her that her knee went out as she was going down the stairs. (Affidavit of Noah 
Converse, ^ l l ,b . ) 
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6. Prior to the April 20, 200r, fall, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox had some cartilage missing in 
her right knee due to osteoarthritis. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for 
Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 11.) 
7. Before her fall on April 20, 2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox reported having pain on the 
lateral side of her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for Admissions and 
Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 13.) 
8. Prior to Linda Fox's fall on April 20,2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was diagnosed with 
having some joint space narrowing in her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First 
Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 14.) 
9. The Plaintiffs had, prior to Trial, determined not to call any expert witnesses and rested 
upon their theory that all elements of the Plaintiffs' claims could be provided for by lay testimony. 
10. The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the instant case that 
may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness are that Linda Fox was 
descending the stairs and she fell. No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's 
senses, testify that whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical 
condition of Linda Fox's knee. 
11. Linda Fox fell without the physical intervention of any actor. 
12. The Plaintiffs' claims were all based solely on alleged negligence of the Defendant. 
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13. No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition 
of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell. 
14. Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the stairs 
and had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were dangerous, the Plaintiffs 
agreed that there would be no expert testimony regarding the condition of the stairs. 
2. The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on any subject, 
including but not limited to: 
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and 
b. Linda Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29,2004; 
precluded evidence that Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, 
osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had loss of cartilage. 
3. The Plaintiffs had not pled, with specificity, any portion of the Provo City Building Code 
in connection with this case nor had they named any person who could testify as to whether or not 
the stairs conformed to the Provo City Building Code. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 9(i), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Court could not find that the stairs failed to conform to safety requirements 
of the building code. 
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4. In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. Fox fell because 
of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for some other cause, the Plaintiffs 
cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation. 
5. In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the reasonable necessity 
of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of 
proof as to damages. 
6. Joseph R. Fox's claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox cannot sustain her 
burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff Joseph R. Fox's claims for loss of 
consortium fails. 
DATED this 1 2 day of ~ P e x ^
 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/FRED D.HOWARD 
JUDGE FRED D. HOWARD 
Fourth District Court 
Approved as to form: 
LINDA A. FOX - Plaintiff 
JOSEPH R. FOX - Plaintiff 
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COPY 
Thomas W. Seiler, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LTNDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BPJGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF 
NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT 
STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING 
EXHIBITS 
Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, 
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present, pro se. The Defendant was present and represented by its 
counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, and David B. Thomas, 
Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University. 
Q\ 
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Upon oral motion, the Plaintiffs objected to the testimony of Noah Converse and Scott Starr 
and to the Utah EMS Incident Report and the Brigham Young University Police Department EMS 
Incident Table with Accompanying Report insofar as the testimony or the exhibits included a written 
or oral statement taken by Mr. Converse or Mr. Starr in their capacity as volunteer Brigham Young 
University Emergency Medical Service personnel attending to the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox on April 
20,2004, on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the 
stairs") to the effect that: 
1. There was no cartilage in Linda A. Fox's right knee due to arthritis; 
2. Linda A. Fox's right knee went out on her as she was going down the stairs; 
3. Linda A. Fox fell down only one stair; 
4. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said words to the effect that her 
knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs and that she did not hold Brigham Young 
University responsible; and 
5. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said that the stairs are too narrow 
and have always been dangerous. (See, generally, the Affidavit of Noah Converse with 
accompanying Exhibits dated February 15, 2005.) 
The Plaintiffs Foxes' objection was based upon Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33, a statutory 
rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if enforceable, would make statements of an injured 
person inadmissible as evidence in a civil proceeding. The Plaintiffs allege that the conditions set 
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forth in Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33 apply. For the purpose of this Ruling, and for that purpose 
only, the Court assumes that the Plaintiffs are accurate in that regard. 
The Court denies the objection. In so doing, the Court relies, in part, upon the following: 
1. Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, which states, in part: 
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature 
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court 
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. ..." 
2. On September 10,1985, the Utah Supreme Court filed a pro curium order in the 
matter of hi Re: Rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of this state. In pertinent 
part, that order states: 
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VHI, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as 
amended, the Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore 
adopted by this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985." 
3. The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules states, in part: 
"Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules ... will be impliedly repealed." 
4. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are admissions by a party 




5. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are, pursuant to Rule 
803(4), an exception to the hearsay rule as a statement for the purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. 
DATED this / 2 . day of ' P e c - _, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/FRED D.HOWARD 
JUDGE FRED D. HOWARD 
Fourth District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING 
EXHIBITS was delivered, this ?lsT" day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the manner 
indicated: 
Linda A. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Joseph R. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
A. 
JL 
- via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
via Facsimile ( ) 




From: <wayne lott@byu edu> 
To: <phpwo@byu edu> 
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 9'50 AM 
Subject: Work Request 
Description: Evaluate how to repair front step plates. Loose metal nose plates are dangerous. Had 
employee fall Friday, August 22 and break his arm after his shoe heel hooked on metal plate. 
After estimate is approved make necessary repairs. 
AcctNumber: 12 210020 6230 
CustRefft: 
BldgLoc: HCEB 
RoomLoc: Front steps 
Requestor: Wayne Lott 
ReqPhone: 84147 
ReqAddress: 396 HCEB 
DepCol: Division of Cont Educ 
ColRepName: Bauer, Gary 
AcctAuth: Wayne J. Lott 
8/25/2003 
L U ^ J JkdlllVJLAJLJk 
Faci l i t ies P lann ing Depar tment 
Job Description 
' REPAIR FRONT STEP PLATES HCEB 
OPTION l OVERLAP EXISTING STEPS AND ADD RAILINGS 
Note This is an estimate only you will be billed the actual costs Any variance from the 
scope as listed will alter the cost All scope changes will require approval 









Dec 5 2003 £./£*/ 
DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
SCOPE. OVERLAP EXISTING STEPS WITH 4" OF CONCRETE AND INSTALL RAILING 
TOW1EETCODE WORK TO BE DONE B\ CONTRACTOR FOR QUESTION OR DETAILS 
















TOTAL ESTIMATED COST 
$50,400 00 





SOURCE OF FUNDING 
Account Number 




cost est HCEB W2627 
12/5/20O3 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
PHYSICAL PLANT DEPARTMENT 
237 BRWB, PROVO, UT 84602 
SHORT FORM CONTRACT NO. 5332 
T° Oveiman Concrete 
1675 North j 820 West 
Piovo, UT 84604 
Conuact Date 19 April 2004 
Project No C4503616-1665-00300 
WoikOrdei No W - 2 6 2 7 
(Heremafter called "Contractor") 
Bngham Young University of Provo, UT (hereinafter called "Owner") engages the contractor to perform and 
complete the following described work, on the terms and subject to the conditions hereafter set forth (mcluding the 
Contract documents identified below): 
A. IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS: Furnish all labor and materials to do the work as 
contained in the plans and specifications entitled i4HCEB - West Stairs Upgrade" dated 23 March 2004, and 
prepared by Bngham Young Umversity Planning Department. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
Brigham Young University Standard Contract Requirements are a part of this contract. 
B. COMPENSATION: 
Total compensation for the above work shall be 
C. TIME OF 
The work shi 
QOMPLETION: 
11 be completed on or before 
D. OWNER'S REPRESENTATIVE IS : 
$44,495.00 
25 May 2004 
Edwin Cozzens 
E. CONTRACTOR'S REPRESENTATIVE IS: Jon Overman 
The Contractor aggress to perform the work covered by this Contract and to comply with and be bound by all of the 
terms and conditions contained in the Contract Documents . 
IGHAM YOUNG UNIVERISTY DATE BRI   
DISTRIBUTION 
1 Legal counseloi 
2, Contractor 
3 PhP Accounting 
4 Financial Services 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
CONTRACT 
Risk M a n a g e m e n t & Safety Dept. 
S U P E R V I S O R ' S R E P O R T OF A C C I D E N T 
(For all B Y U Personnel ) 
r u H Ur-HCE USE ONLY 
CENTERED 2Q03 08 \ -513*) 
Case No 
Dates (21 days) (45) 
• NO DOCTOR • EXPOSURE 
^ / A P P R O V E D 
D E- D DENIED 
THE RECEIPT OF THIS REPORT IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY 
EMPLOYEE: The pink copy of this form is provided for your Information and personal file. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
ADDITIONAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION INFORMATION. 
Full Name of Injured/Ill Individual. Gfoti&t 3~> T*ALS<J Date of Birth 3/ JrlW JLltfu 
Local Address J*/j / M '1'5'D C PrOt'o Ct A ?j&> V Telephone Pe)/-3 fr-fifo F~ 7/5'9 
(Street & Number) (City) (State) (Zip) (Home) (Work Ext ) 
Social Security Number 32 F - 5 V - OtiC L 
No. of Minor Dependents under 18 yrs. old. J 2 _ 
_ Marital Status. 
Job Title pjrCcrati 
JL Age <*$ Sex A ? 
&y^f T/?Av*L s/xA<r/« 
Date Hired at BYU / Sep r J 9 7 j OR Approx. Length of Service at BYU 3O • Days D Weeks D Months MS Years 
Department T/?Ai/£L S^/?jo/if - ^M f. <Cc/ucMame of Supervisor _ 
(Department or division where individual is regularly employed) (Please Print) 
Name of Health Insurance Company Q fl) flA Name of Personal Physician K^b<i r r bJ, TJL y /#?» 
* MEDICAL INFORMATION AUTHORIZATION • 
I AUTHORIZE THE BYU RISK MANAGEMENT & SAFETY DEPT TO OBTAIN OR RELEASE INFORMATION RELATING TO THIS CLAIM. 
I UNDERSTAND, AGREE AND CONSENT THAT THIS AUTHORIZATION SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT INDEFINITELY. 
A photocopy of this authorization shall be accepted as granting the same authority as the signed original. 
>Ok^ 
/ * Individual's Signature 
i J3 Pcuj & A r^J/jol 
Witness of Signature 
NOTE: FAILURE TO COMPLETE ALL SECTIONS OF THIS FORM DELAYS CLAIM REVIEW AND/OR PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
A „ D A M B A M 
Accident: Date 3L$o 3 Day of Week £riDZ\s Hour of Day £/ A? Q T M Hour Shift Began Y>%n. 
Location of Accident or Exposure UJzs^T j r / V * / ^ * Gt P TT4tL, / ^ / ? t / } v / ( Z r t & r t V t * > * / ^ * A j £ i d?/r/Q 
(Building, room, parking lot, otf-camp/Js address, etc ) ' 
How Did the Accident Occur? 
(Name the chemical which irritated skin, identify the object and weight being lifted, pulled, etc ) 
D PM 
Check ( / ) all below that apply: 
D ACT OF OTHER THAN INJURED 
D DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT / MATERIALS 
D EXPOSURE TO PHYSICAL AGENTS (Envir Heat, Low Temp, Plants, Insects, etc) 
D HORSEPLAY 
D IMPROPER PROCEDURES > INSUFFICIENT TRAINING 
D IMPROPER / LACK OF PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
-WAS SAFETY APPAREL / EQUIPMENT PROVIDED? D YES D NO 
D MEDICAL CONDITION 
• POOR HOUSEKEEPING / MAINTENANCE 
• UNSAFE ACT BY INDIVIDUAL 
Describe the Injury or Illness in Detail and Indicate the Body Part(s) Affected / ^ ; z r&f* C&iufAr /AJ /}!* fa / stic/* *, 
Did Individual Receive Medical Care? Yes \ No. (Check / ) Health Center _ 
Attending Physician's Name KnkJ fa/* \nr cf /7/7fsr\ Sr/s/tufielerred to: Specialist's Name. 
Did Individual Lose Any Work Time Due to the Accident (other than the shift in which accident occurred)? Yes . 
f Yes, Date Individual Left Work and Date Returned to Work 
Hospital S X - /?<?^_> 
No fif*r i/c r 
dumber of Hours Individual Works Per Day . Number of Days Individual Works Per Week 
Check / ) Part-time • Full-time. Staff • Admin S3 Faculty • Wage of Salary' $ 
(receives benefits) 
ay D Month D Y e a r 
a 5' A U4tfJ r~- 3oa3 
^Date accident was reported to supervisor) 
(Dajfe supervisor filled out report) 
NOTICE: IMMEDIATELY REPORT ALL FATALITIES, SERIOUS INJURIES AND OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESSES TO RISK MANAGEMENT & 
SAFETY DEPT; REPORT MINOR INJURIES WITHIN 24 HOURS, 
distribution: White, Risk Management & Safety Dept, Yellow, Health Center/Hospital, Biue, Supervisor, Pink, Injured/Ill Individual #16357 
0 \J) >' <h?f 
WH/TE - Provide 
CANARY- EMS Office 
PIKK - Ho*pJiW 
[To Scene: 
C Lights/Siren 
5J Silent Run 
From Scene* 
r Lights / Siren 
£ SilRnt Run 
PMlomWat'WW " 
UTAH EMS INCIDENT REPORT 




Was CPft initiated prior 





 ' *>-fcPir. ' ' t^/Wr^^yUrtWT^1 1 1 1! 
PastwS 
/•d< f^d. A*^f// ^ .flfefe. 
ifety equipment usage, 
(Seat belt, helmet, 





Suspicion of alcohol 
usa? 






City ^J^Sate Zip Coda 
Primary Insurance Nunjp&j 
Number Modi* 
Group Insurance Number 
Medicaid Number 
j&ig 32—£^£inf ("Aix 
CurrortLModicatK>ns 2& i ,l£L 
Aliorgies ^ y 
Nariat»v( 
*fa}J€ frfti^ < * , y f ^ Qrt4*~<?n^ 1*J4* J f a l l 
l<JQh ftjyjflMglfl tit/ell*/) 4f\J /*GrCpnd. M^^k _ _ _ -fe/) fau^^Ae <fJ*tif* **4<kl**z MMJiX 
^fe^^^wfe iff 
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David B. Thomas (3228) 
Attorney for Defendants 
Brigham Young University 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo,UT 84602-1333 
Telephone: (801) 422-4722 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, : DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST 
Plaintiffs, : FOR ADMISSIONS 
vs. 
Brigham Young University, : 
a Utah Corporation Case No. 040401488 
: Judge Taylor 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, Brigham Young 
University provides the following responses to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admission. 
GENERAL OBJECTION 
Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admission, generally and so far as it 
seeks admissions or responses which is privileged, not relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action, does not relate to a claim or defense in the pending action, or is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In addition, defendant 
generally objects to the plaintiffs' request in so far as they are unduly burdensome and vexatious 
and they seek specificity beyond that which is required under the rules of discovery. 
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Without waiving the general objection stated herein, the defendant responds to the 
plaintiffs' requests as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that, on and before April 20, 2004, the defendant was and is the sole 
and exclusive owner and operator of the Harmon Building and Conference Center on the campus 
ofBYU. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1: Admitted 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that the photograph in the upper left-hand corner of Exhibit A attached 
to the complaint on file herein depicts the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference 
Center as the west stairway appeared on or about April 20, 2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center 
referred to in the preceding Request was, on or about April 20,2004, intended for the use of 
patrons entering and leaving the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that on and before April 20, 2004, the west stairway adjacent the west 
doors at the Harmon Building and Conference Center, as depicted in Exhibit A attached to the 
complaint on file herein, was used by patrons of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4: Denied 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that tickets to Women's Conference were being sold in the Harmon 
Building on April 20, 2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: Admitted. 
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REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the plaintiff Linda A. Fox purchased a ticket to Women's 
Conference in the Harmon Building on April 20, 2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that the plaintiff Linda A. Fox was a business invitee of the defendant 
when she descended the west stairway of the Harmon building after purchasing a ticket to 
Women's Conference on April 20, 2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 7: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that the plaintiff Linda A. Fox was found injured on the west stairway 
of the Harmon Building and Conference Center by the defendant's employees on April 20, 2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 8: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the plaintiff Linda A. Fox was found injured on the west stairway 
of the Harmon Building and Conference Center by the defendant's employees on April 20, 2004 
after purchasing a ticket to Women's Conference. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that the plaintiff Linda A. Fox fell on the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building and was injured after purchasing a ticket to Women's Conference on April 20, 
2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that on April 20, 2004, one or more of the defendant's employees 
inquired of the plaintiff Linda whether she had fallen on the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that on April 20, 2004, one or more of the defendant's employees 
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were informed that the plaintiff Linda had fallen and was injured on the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 12: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that on April 20, 2004, defendant's employees from the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center called the defendant's EMT personnel to come to the aid of the 
plaintiff Linda. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that on April 20,2004, one or more of defendant's employees from 
the Harmon Building and Conference Center spoke with the plaintiff Linda after she had fallen 
on the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that before April 20, 2004, one or more persons have been injured 
while using the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that before April 20, 2004, an employee of the defendant had been 
injured while using the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 16: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the defendant's EMT personnel came to the 
aid of the plaintiff Linda after she had fallen on the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 17: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the plaintiff Linda had informed employees 
of the defendant that she had fallen and been injured on the west stairway of Harmon Building 
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and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 18: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel put a splint, 
or other device, on the plaintiff Linda's right leg. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 19: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel made a 
written report regarding the services rendered the plaintiff Linda. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 20: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel, or some 
other employee, placed a notice on the plaintiff Linda's vehicle which was parked in the 60 
minute parking adjacent the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 21: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that the notice referred to in the preceding Request stated that the 
plaintiff Linda had broken her leg. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 22: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel treated the 
plaintiff Linda for a broken leg. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 23: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel transported 
the plaintiff Linda to the Emergency Room at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 24: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel were 
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informed by hospital personnel that the plaintiff Linda had a broken leg. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 25: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that on or about April 23,2004, the defendant's EMT personnel, 
who had come to the aid of Linda on the west stairway, visited Linda in her hospital room 
seeking to recover the splint they had used to immobilize her right leg. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 26: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that on April 20,2004 the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center where the plaintiff was found by the defendant's employees was in disrepair. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 27: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff 
Linda to use ordinary care in maintaining the west stairway in good repair. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 28: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff 
Linda to inspect the west stairway for defects and to repair the defects or to warn the plaintiff 
Linda of the defects. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 29: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that on or before April 20,2004, the defendant failed to repair the 
defects in the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 30: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that on April 20,2004, the defendant did not inform the plaintiff 
Linda of any defects in the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 31: Admitted. 
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REQUEST NO. 32: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the defendant did not warn the plaintiff 
Linda not to use the west stairway. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 32: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the defendant was negligent in its duty to 
maintain the west stairway in a reasonably safe condition. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 33: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 34: Admit that on April 20,2004, that a defective condition on the stairway of 
the Harmon Building and Conference Center was the proximate cause of the plaintiff Linda's 
injuries. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 34: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that on and before April 20,2004, the steps of the west stairway of 
the Harmon Building and Conference Center were deteriorating. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 35: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that on April 20,2004, the steps of the west stairway were fitted with 
metal nosings. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 36: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 37: Admit that on and before April 20,2004, the concrete surface underneath 
the metal nosings of the steps of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference 
Center was decaying. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 37: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that on and before April 20,2004, there were gaps in the concreter 
surface underneath the metal nosings of the steps of the west stairway of the Harmon Building 
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and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 38: Denied. 
REQUEST N0.39: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the metal nosings on the steps of the west 
stairway were more than 20 years old. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 39: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 40: Admit that on April 20,2004, the metal nosings on the steps of the west 
stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center were loose in the vicinity where the 
plaintiff Linda was found injured by the defendant's employees. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 40: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 41: Admit that on April 20, 2004, the metal nosings on the steps of the west 
stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center in the vicinity of where the plaintiff 
Linda was found injured by the defendant's employees clattered when stepped on. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 41: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 42: Admit that on or after April 20, 2004, repairs were made to the metal 
nosings of the west stairway in the vicinity of where the injured plaintiff Linda was found by the 
defendant's employees. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 42: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 42 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence since all 
repairs made to the stairs of the Harmon Building are inadmissible under the doctrine of 
subsequent remedial repair. 
REQUEST NO. 43: Admit that on April 20,2004, the runs of the steps of the west stairway did 
not conform to the requirements of the 1994 version of the Uniform Building Code. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 43: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 44: Admit that on April 20,2004, the risers of the steps of the west stairway did 
not conform to the requirements of the 1994 version fo the Uniform Building Code. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 44: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 45: Admit that the costs of construction, remodeling, and repairs to the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center exceeded $1,000,000.00 in the past 5 years. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 45: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 46: Admit that the costs of construction, remodeling, and repairs of buildings, 
lands, and improvements on the campus of BYU have exceeded $5,000,000.00 each year for the 
past five years. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST N O. 46: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 47: Admit that the costs of construction, remodeling, and repairs of buildings, 
lands, and improvements on the campus of BYU have exceeded $10,000,000.00 each year for the 
past five years. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 47: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 48: Admit that the costs of construction and repairs of buildings, lands, and 
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improvements on the campus of BYU have exceeded $25,000,000.00 each year for the past five 
years. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 48: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 49: Admit that the defendant has spent more than one hundred million dollars 
for constructing, improving, and repairing buildings and lands on the campus of BYU since the 
construction of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 49: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 50: Admit that since the original construction of the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building and Conference Center, the defendant has spent more than $1,000,000.00 in 
construction, remodeling, repairs, and improvements for the Harmon Building and Conference 
Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 50: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 45 on the 
basis that it is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and thus 
denies the same. 
REQUEST NO. 51: Admit that on or before April 20, 2004, the west stairway of the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center was required by applicable building codes to have intermediate 
hand rails. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 51: Denied. 
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REQUEST NO. 52: Admit that within the year before April 20, 2004, the defendant's employees 
did not regularly inspect the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center for 
defects. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 52: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 53: Admit that within the year before April 20, 2004, the defendant's employees 
did not maintain records of inspections of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 53: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 54: Admit that within the year before April 20,2004, the defendant's employees 
did not budget for repairs and maintenance of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 54: Denied. 
REQUEST NO. 55: Admit that within the year before April 20, 2004, the defendant's employees 
or agents did not obtain a Provo City building permit for repairs and maintenance to the west 
stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 55: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 56: Admit that within the year before April 20, 2004, the defendant's employees 
did not enter into a contract with an outside firm for repairs and maintenance of the west stairway 
of the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 56: Defendant specifically objects to Request No. 56 as not 
being reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence on the basis that 
evidence of repair are inadmissible under the doctrine of subsequent remedial repair. 
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REQUEST NO. 57: Admit that within the year before April 20, 2004, the defendant's 
employees did not enter into contract with an outside firm to renovate the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 57: Denied. 
Dated this 16th day of August, 2004. 
David Br Thomas 
Attorney for Defendant Brigham Young University 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS was sent by U.S. Mail, first class, 
postage prepaid, on the 16th day of August, 2004 to the following: 
Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox 
572 South 1750 East 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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David B. Thomas (3228) 
Attorney for Defendants 
Brigham Young University 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo,UT 84602-1333 
Telephone: (801) 422-4722 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, : DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
Plaintiffs, : INTERROGATORIES 
vs. : 
Brigham Young University, : 
a Utah Corporation Case No. 040401488 
: Judge Taylor 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant provides the 
following answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories: 
GENERAL OBJECTION 
Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories to the Defendant generally and 
insofar as it seeks to impose burdens and obligations upon defendant beyond those imposed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, defendant objects to plaintiffs' interrogatories 
on the grounds that they are unduly burdensome and vexatious and that they seek specificity 
beyond that which is required under the rules of discovery. 
Without waiving the objection stated herein, the defendant responds to plaintiffs' 
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interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. State the name and address of each and every person who provided information in answering 
these interrogatories. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: 
David Lawrence 
122 Thomas House 
Brigham Young University 
Provo, Utah 84602 
Paul Byrd 
1520 WSC 
Brigham Young University 
Provo, UT 84602 
Cory Starley 
739 E. Scenic Drive 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Jim Dain 
Dffi. Building SVCS 
PF Director's Office 
217BRWB 
Provo, UT 84602 




Provo, UT 84602 








Provo, UT 84602 
Paul Reese 
SR Design Engineer 
PF Director's Office 
240 BRWB 
Provo, UT 84602 
Noah Converse 
1722 W. 680 N. 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84602 
Scott Starr 
Missionary Training Center 
2005 N. 900 E. 
Provo, UT 84606-1783 
Duane Sweat 
Skilled Craft Supervisor 
PF Director's Office 
277 BRWB 





Provo, UT 84602 
2. For each person identified in answer to the preceding interrogatory, state for each person the 
information provided by that person. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: David Lawrence provided the risk management 
report. 
Paul Byrd provided the names and address of the EMS personnel. 
Wayne Lott provided information about the physical plants work on the stairs 
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Cory Lynn Starley is a BYU student employee in the Continuing Education department located in 
the Harmon Bldg. He was exiting the building when he saw a woman sitting on the stairway 
over to his right and about halfway down the stairs holding her leg, between the first and second 
landing. Cory went back in the building and called the EMSs. After he called, he returned to the 
stairs and stayed with Linda A. Fox until the EMSs came. 
Cory Dean Muhlestein is the area supervisor in the Custodial Shop. His office overlooks the 
west stairway of the Harmon Building where Linda A. Fox fell. He saw her when a BYU student 
was attending her. He also provided information about custodial maintenance of the stairs. 
Paul Reese is a Senior Design Engineer in the PF Directors Office. He provided information 
about repair and maintenance of the buildings. 
Duane Sweat is the Skilled Craft Supervisor of PF Director's Office. He provided information 
about work done on the steps. 
Kendall Wilson is the concrete specialist carpenter in the Carpenter Shop. He provided 
information about work done on the Harmon Building west stairway. 
Scott Starr is one of the EMS personnel that responded to the accident. He provided information 
about her treatment. 
Noah Converse is one of the EMS personnel that responded to the accident. He provided 
information about her treatment. 
3. State each and every fact, opinion, conclusion, and rule of law upon which the defendant will 
rely in defending the plaintiffs' claims for damages. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 3 on the basis 
that before the Court are not only the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint, but a 
Second Amended Complaint for which a motion to amend is pending. Defendant has not filed 
an answer in the case since which Complaint needs to be answered has not been determined by 
the Court. Thus, it is impossible at this time to articulate or define defenses or any statements 
concerning opinions, conclusions, or rules of law. 
4. State the name and address of each witness that the defendant will, or may, call to testify in 
4 
defense of the plaintiffs' claims and in support of the defendant's defenses. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Since plaintiffs' attempted amendment of their 
Complaint is still pending before the Court and since defendant has not answered, discovery has 
not been appropriately defined, thus, defendant has not identified through discovery the witnesses 
that will be called. 
5. For each witness identified in the preceding interrogatory, state in detail the substance of the 
witness's testimony. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 4 above. 
6. State the name and address of the each and every person responsible for the repairs and 
maintenance of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center for the past 10 
years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Paul Reese, Wayne Lott, Cory Muhlestein, and 
Kendal Wilson. See addresses in Answer to Interrogatory No. 1. 
7. State the names and addresses of the defendants EMT personnel who rendered services to 
the plaintiff Linda on April 20,2004. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Defendant maintains no EMT personnel. The 
voluntary EMS personnel who provided services to Linda on April 20, 2004 were Noah 
Converse and Scott Starr, see addresses provided in Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 above. 
8. State the names and addresses of each and every employee of the defendant selling tickets to 
Women's Conference in the Harmon Building on April 20, 2004. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Defendant has been unable to identify each and 
every individual selling tickets to the Women's Conference in the Harmon Building on April 20, 
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2004, but will supplement this answer as such information is available. 
9. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: No interrogatory is found for No. 9, thus no response 
is provided. 
10. State the names and addresses of each and every person who performed maintenance and 
repairs on the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center within the past 5 
years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 6. 
11. State in detail the repairs and maintenance performed on the west stairway of the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center for the past 5 years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Maintenance and repairs on the west stairs of the 
Harmon Building and Conference Center has been varied and ranges from snow removal and 
sweeping to minor repair and upkeep. Such maintenance and repairs have been done on an as 
needed basis or when a specific request is made. 
12. State the name and address of the person, or persons, who has custody of the records of 
expenditures for repairs and maintenance of the Harmon Building and Conference Center, 
including the west stairway for the past 5 years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Duane Sweat, see address in Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1 above; BYU Accounting Office, D-148 ASB, Provo, UT 84602. 
13. If not previously stated, state the name and address of the person, or persons, who have 
custody of the plans and specifications for the construction, remodeling, renovation, repair, and 
maintenance of the Harmon Building and Conference Center, including the west stairway. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 13 insofar 
as it requests information concerning rennovation or repairs which have taken place since April 
20,2004 as not being reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence since 
subsequent remedial repair is not admissible as evidence. Without waiving such objection, the 
person having custody of the plans and specifications for the construction of the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center is Ed Cozzens, 202 BRWB, Provo, UT 84602. 
14. State the name and address of each and every person, employee or otherwise, who has been 
injured using the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference Center within the past 
10 years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Defendant is unaware of the name and address of 
anyone who has been injured using the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference 
Center within the last ten years. 
15. State each and every reason, whether fact, opinion, or conclusion, why, on April 20, 2004, 
there were no intermediate hand rails on the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 15 on the 
basis that the question is vague and ambiguous as to the term "intermediate hand rails" so as to 
make the question not only unintelligible, but precludes defendant from otherwise responding. 
To the extent relevant, defendant asserts that the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center has always met the applicable building code. 
16. State each and every reason, whether fact, opinion, or conclusion, why, on April 20, 2004, 
the metal nosings on the steps of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and Conference 
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Center were loose. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Defendant specifically objects to Interrogatory No. 
16 as assuming facts that are not in evidence. In addition, plaintiff has not alleged nor asserted 
that loose metal nosings of the stairs was the cause or even reasonably related to her fall, nor is 
she able to identify where she did fall. Whether metal nosings on the stairway in places other 
than where plaintiff is or is not loose, is not evidence reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence and therefore, defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 16. 
17. State the date of each and every inspection conducted of the west stairway of the Harmon 
Building and Conference Center for the past 5 years. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: The west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center is regularly checked if not on a daily, a weekly basis, by the custodial shop 
staff and employees. In addition, Physical Plant conducts a one and five year inspection for the 
purpose of determining whether such facilities need to be replaced. The last five year check took 
place in the year 2000. 
18. For each inspection identified in the preceding interrogatory, state the name and address of 
the person, or persons, conducting the inspections. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Paul Reese, see address above in Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1, and Cory Dean Muhlestein, see address in Answer to Interrogatory No. 1 
above. 
19. State in detail each and every statement, whether written or oral, made by the plaintiff 
Linda to the defendant's employees, or to any other person known to the defendant, on April 20, 
2004, and thereafter. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Linda A. Fox said that she has no cartilage in her 
knee due to arthritis. She did not remember tripping or slipping when she fell. She said that her 
knee just went out. When asked if there were any physical conditions that contributed to her fall, 
she answered that there were not. She said she was familiar with the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building because she used to work in the building. She said that the stairway was 
difficult to navigate because their dimensions were too narrow and different from the more 
standard dimensions she was used to using. She said she could not walk and she was sure her leg 
was broken. She said she did not hold BYU responsible at all because of the bad condition of her 
knee and her familiarity of the stairway. She also reported that she and her family had been 
talking the night before about the bad condition of her knees. She indicated that there was 
surprise expressed by her family that she had not had a serious accident because of the weakened 
condition of her knees. 
20. State in detail each and every statement, observation, comment, or complaint, whether 
written or oral, made to the defendant concerning the condition of the west stairway of the 
Harmon Building and Conference Center within the past 5 years, whether by an employee or 
otherwise. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Defendant objects to the broad sweeping nature of 
Interrogatory No. 20 insofar as it is both burdensome and vexatious, and to the extent that it is 
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving such 
objection, in the summer of 2003 Physical Plant determined that the stairs needed to be replaced 
with estimates on the cost for replacement being submitted to the administration on December 5, 
2003. A contract for the replacement of the stairs was awarded on April 7,2004. 
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21. State the name and address of the manufacturer and person or firm who provided and 
installed the metal nosings on the steps of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Zwick Construction Company, Salt Lake City, UT. 
22. State the name and model number of the metal nosings on the steps of the west stairway of 
the Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Unknown. 
23. State the name and address of the defendant's employee who spoke to the plaintiff Joseph 
on or about April 23,2004, on the steps of the west stairway of the Harmon Building and 
Conference Center. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Bill Trapp, see address in Answer to Interrogatory 
No. 1. 
24. State in detail each and every statement and report whether written or oral, made by the 
employee identified in the preceding interrogatory concerning the conversation with the plaintiff 
Joseph on or about April 23, 2004. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Bill Trapp indicates that he saw Joseph R. Fox 
from his office window pulling up the metal nosing of the stairs in various places. After 
watching him, Bill indicates that he went down and spoke with Mr. Fox. Bill Trapp indicates 
that after watching Mr. Fox scrape out the concrete and pull up the nosing, he asked him, "What 
the hell do you think you are doing?" Fox responded, "They are loose." Trapp responded, 
"Well, they are now." Trapp asked Fox to stop and leave. 
25. State the date that the defendant contacted for the renovation of the west stairway of the 
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Harmon Building and Conference Center. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25: Defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 25 as not 
being reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence since rennovation or 
repair of the west stairway after April 20, 2004 is inadmissible as evidence of subsequent 
remedial repair and thus, not admissible. 
Dated this 17th day of August, 2004. 
David B. Thomas 
Attorney for Defendant Brigham Young University 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES was sent by U.S. Mail, first class, 
postage prepaid, on the 17th day of August, 2004 to the following: 
Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox 
572 South 1750 East 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
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Dr. J. Faux/Central Utah Med Clinic* 
UV Radiology 
Dr. Craig Patten** 
Central Surgical Center 
Central Utah Multi-Specialty Clinic* 
Mt. Land Collections (Gassman) 
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Total $32,988.96 $33,979.43 
^im Detail with Notes 
Claim RF0005864473 Claimant Fox, Linda Anne 
ss Date 4/20/2004 Case Type Indemnity Status Open Coverage General Liability 
Description Female visitor fell on HCEB exterior stairs. She suffered a fracture of tibula 
plateu with a stay at the UVRMC 
See "Notes" to General Counsel. 



















W4, Legal - IAWRENCEDW £ 
al Counsel: 
Total Incurred $112,500 Recoveries $0 
nd reported wife's claim. Wife was in hospital after fracturing leg on HCEB stairs. He said to me that she told him that her "legs gave out". She 
st purchased a ticket to woman's conference inside the building and was descending the west exterior stairs. 
spears to be a serious injury (fractured tibia plateau of the right leg of a 55 year-old woman) that has requires a hospital stay, surgery, screws, 
and restricted mobility. It will also require surgery to remove hardware and possible knee replacement. 
iing to husband, his wife has no health & accident insurance. 
section of the stairs shows some deterioration in the cement and some of the wide metal walk strips (on edge of each step) make a clack noise 
'ou step on them. They seem flush with the step but have missing screws so they aren't tight to the cement Nothing I saw concerning the above 
i to be a noteworthy hazard and none near the area, I was shown by custodial, she was thought to have fallen. 
er, the edges of the metal strips, which form the edge of each stair, seemed worn down to me and allowed slipping if one had one's weight on 
wouldn't say they were slick per se, but they were slicker than the cement they were attached to. 1 don't know yet, but they appear to have had a 
on them originally (20 years old?) but has now worn down. I am also concerned that there were no railing options other than at the far edges of 
uite wide stairs. 
heless, this does not make the stairs a hazard but less safe than they could be and maybe worse when wet. 
sband had inspected the stairs one day himself and found a metal strip he could actually pull up, but according to building maintenance, the strip 
ish at the time of the accident and not at the area where she fell anyway. 
et my reserve considering the seriousness of the injury and the potential for some liability exposure. 
)4, Legal - LAWRENCEDW 
irking on location of loss but have more info. 
report indicates: Patient reported that she was going down the stairs when her knee gave out and she fell down one stair. It also says claimant 
't hold BYU responsible^ and that she also said, that the stairs in this area are too narrow and have always been dangerous. 
fl) EMT report indicates: past medical history of patient is. No cartilage in knee due to arthritis It doesn't say which knee. 
lesday, February 16,2005 
Basic Detail With Notes/Ids rmd tra/2003.04 30 
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